Inattentive consumers and product quality
WebJul 5, 2012 · A firm may offer a low-quality product to exploit these inattentive consumers. In the unique symmetric equilibrium of the model, firms choose prices with mixed … WebThis paper presents a model in which some consumers shop on the basis of price alone, without attention to product quality. A firm may “cheat” (i.e., cut quality) to exploit these …
Inattentive consumers and product quality
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WebMay 1, 2012 · We study a market with rationally inattentive consumers who are unsure of the terms of the offers made by firms, but can acquire information about the terms at a … WebInattentive Consumers and Product Quality. Mark Armstrong and Yongmin Chen () MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany. Abstract: This paper studies a model in which some consumers shop on the basis of price alone, without attention to potential differences in product quality. A firm may offer a low-quality product to exploit these ...
WebThis paper presents a model in which some consumers shop on the basis of price alone, without attention to product quality. A firm may “cheat ” (i.e., cut quality) to exploit these … WebA firm may offer a low-quality product to exploit these inattentive consumers. In the unique symmetric equilibrium of the model, firms choose prices with mixed strategies, similarly …
WebInattentive Consumers and Product Quality Mark Armstrong and Yongmin Chen Journal of the European Economic Association, 2009, vol. 7, issue 2-3, 411-422 Abstract: We present a model in which some consumers shop on the basis of price alone, without paying attention to product quality. WebFeb 10, 2014 · Using a standard strategic pricing game, I determine how sellers set prices when facing buyers who are “rationally inattentive” to information about product quality. Two cases are studied: strategically sophisticated buyers who are rationally inattentive to exogenous information about quality and strategically naïve buyers who are ...
Webthat is, controlling for movie quality, being #1 is associated with a $75 mil-lion increase in revenues, which is consistent with Proposition 1 . Testing Proposition 3. Proposition 3 states that, the greater the measure of inattentive consumers (parameter /), the greater the impact of being #1 through the awareness channel.
WebDownloadable! This paper studies a model in which some consumers shop on the basis of price alone, without attention to potential differences in product quality. A firm may offer a low-quality product to exploit these inattentive consumers. In the unique symmetric equilibrium of the model, firms choose prices with mixed strategies, similarly to Varian … c# string format 16進数WebThis paper presents a model in which some consumers shop on the basis of price alone, without attention to product quality. A firm may “cheat” (i.e., cut quality) to exploit these inattentive consumers. In the unique symmetric equilibrium, firms follow a mixed strategy involving both price and quality dispersion. early learning coalition st johns countyWebFeb 5, 2024 · Abstract We study a monopolistic firm’s various sales strategies to sell a new product to a rationally (in)attentive consumer who can conduct costly learning to resolve valuation uncertainty. c# string format 16진수WebThe presence of inattentive consumers harms attentive consumers, and enables firms to earn positive profits. With many sellers, approximately half of them will cheat. A market … early learning coalition seminole floridaWebAug 15, 2016 · The Demand for Natural Food Products. Clean labels are very popular throughout the industry and the demand for simple ingredients is influencing the sales of … c# string format 0埋めWebMay 25, 2024 · We model customer choice based on the theory of rational inattention in the economics literature, which enables us to capture not only the impact of true quality and price, but also the intricate effects of customer’s prior beliefs and cost of information acquisition and processing. early learning coalition seminoleWebIn our model, inattentive consumers are unsophisticated and make no attempt to infer quality from a supplier's price.2 Indeed, a firm's price completely reveals its choice of quality in equilibrium, and a Bayesian consumer could infer quality even if she cannot observe it … early learning coalition okaloosa fl